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Abstract
Purpose – In order to deepen our knowledge of governance of family firms, the purpose of this paper is to
focus our attention on the relation between family owners who are members of the board of directors and firm
performance. Also, this study sheds more light on how the generation in charge of the family firm affects that
relationship, as generational involvement may be a unique predictor of governance behavior in these firms.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors applied a cross-sectional ordinary least squares
regression model to test the hypotheses on a sample of 313 non-listed Spanish family SMEs. The authors
suggest the possibility of a non-linear relationship between the percentage of ownership by family
members of the board of directors and firm performance, and specifically, the authors propose an S-shaped
effect that implies two breakpoints.
Findings – The authors find not only that an inverted U-shaped relationship exists, but also an S-shaped
relationship between family board members’ ownership and firm performance in family SMEs. Nevertheless,
the results are different in comparing first-, second- and later-generation family firms.
Originality/value – This is one of the few empirical studies that examine the relationship between family
board ownership and firm performance in the context of non-listed family SMEs. The authors consider that
the influences of family directors on the board of directors as well as the concentration of family ownership on
the board of directors are worth studying in non-listed family SMEs. Moreover, previous studies have focused
mainly on large listed family firms but not on unlisted ones.
Keywords Ownership, SME, Generation, Performance, Board of directors, Agency theory, Family firm,
Family board ownership
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
The ownership structure and the effect of the corporate governance mechanism on firm behavior
are some of the most debated issues in business and management literature since the seminal
article of Berle and Means (1932). Most studies have tried to identify effective mechanisms and
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requirements for solving agency problems arising for top management in the situation of diffuse
shareholder structure and separation of ownership and control (e.g. Fama and Jensen, 1983;
Jensen andMeckling, 1976). Moreover, most of those studies have focused on large publicly listed
firms (e.g. Morck et al., 1988; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006).
Within the analysis of ownership structure, firms may be differentiated from each other
depending not only on whether their ownership is more or less dispersed but also on the
nature of the owners (Iannotta et al., 2007). This happens, for instance, in family firm, which
can be understood as a business where one family (or more) exerts power over the
organization and its strategic direction through ownership, top management team and/or
board positions (Pieper et al., 2008). The ownership in such firms – identified as the
predominant type of organizations around the world (e.g. La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio and
Lang, 2002; Claessens et al., 2002) – is often concentrated within a controlling family,
and thus, is regarded as a particular case for the study of ownership structure (Anderson
and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006).
In private family firms, most of which are family SMEs, the influence of the family in the
firm takes the form of family involvement in ownership, governance and/or management.
According to agency theory these firms could have a problem of ownership and control, not
only as first described by Jensen and Meckling (1976) (i.e. shareholders and managers
agency conflict), but also between majority shareholders (controlling owner family) and
minority shareholders (i.e. principal–principal problem), between family members in
different roles in the business, or as a result of altruism, and so forth (Chrisman et al., 2004;
Schulze et al., 2001; Songini and Gnan, 2015).
The agency consequence of ownership in family SMEs is therefore still open to debate
since governance mechanisms are often related to family influence and control, and family
owners tend to consider their organizations as an extension of themselves (Miller and Le
Breton-Miller, 2005).
The governance mechanisms try to employ the organizational resources to resolve
conflicts and align the interest of the different stakeholders of the firm (Daily et al., 2003),
and to achieve it, the firm should use a variety of corporate governance mechanisms to
facilitate the balance of interests of its stakeholders (Chrisman et al., 2004). In the case of
family firms, the governance mechanisms used vary in terms of their extent and type, and
this, in the words of Daspit et al. (2018), means creating substantial heterogeneity in family
firm behavior and performance. Therefore, it is interesting to analyze how a source of family
control acts in a formal governance mechanism such as in the case of the board of directors.
Moreover, despite increasing research efforts, empirical evidence on the influence of
ownership structure on family firm performance has produced mixed results (for a review, e.
g., see Tsao et al., 2009; Villalonga et al., 2015). In this regard, there are various issues which
remain unresolved, and therefore, the literature continues to study various aspects of the
interaction among family ownership and different governance mechanisms that can
originate from inside or outside the firm (Chrisman et al., 2018).
In order to deepen our knowledge on the governance of family firms, in this study we
focus our attention on the relation between family ownership, board composition and firm
performance, given that, as Chua et al. (2012) asserted, the accumulation of power
unrestricted by external board members or outside owners leads to personalistic and
particularistic behavior that are sources of heterogeneity in family firms. Thus, our study of
Spanish family non-listed SMEs examines the influence of family owners who are members
of the board of directors to understand the effect of this mechanism on firm performance.
The second objective of this study is to shed light on how the generation in charge of the
family firm affects family directorship and firm performance relationship.
The paper contributes to the literature on the impact of ownership structure on firm
performance in the following ways. First, our findings provide a new perspective on the role
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that family ownership plays in corporate governance as an internal mechanism in family
firms. Previous studies have investigated the effect of the degree of family ownership on
performance by taking the percentage of shares held by managers who are family members
but few have analyzed the percentage of ownership by the family members of the board.
Second, this study expands on several others exploring non-linear effects of family board
ownership (FOB) on firm performance. Specifically, it is hypothesized that there exists not
only an inverted U-shaped relationship, but also an S-shaped relationship between those
variables. Third, we analyze the relationship between ownership structure and firm
performance using family ownership in the board as an independent variable in comparing
first-, second- and later-generation family firms. The motivation of family directors toward
performance is different from that of non-family directors (Chua et al., 1999) and is perhaps
dissimilar between different generations of family firms. Fourth, previous studies have
focused on relatively large publicly listed family firms, however, only a small amount of
available literature focuses on unlisted family SMEs. Moreover, family firms with highly
concentrated ownership are common in most countries with the exception of Anglo-
American ones (e.g. the USA and the UK) (La Porta et al., 1999).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section presents the
relevant literature regarding ownership structure and presents the hypotheses and models
to be tested. Section 3 sets out the data, the measurement of the variables and the procedures
for analysis used in undertaking this empirical study. The empirical results are reported in
the penultimate section. Finally, the conclusions, implications and limitations are discussed
in Section 5.
2. Theoretical debate and hypotheses development
2.1 Governance mechanisms: ownership concentration and board of directors
Empirical evidence collected from large publicly listed Anglo-American companies has long
enabled studies of the principal–agent problem described by Jensen and Meckling (1976),
and Fama and Jensen (1983), where dispersed shareholders (principals) are forced to
delegate control to top managers (agents) giving rise to the so-called Type I principal–agent
problem. Consistent with the monitory hypothesis, concentrated ownership among top
management can mitigate the classical principal–agent conflict by aligning the interest of
managers and shareholders. However, a concentrated ownership structure can lead to the
appearance of agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders
(i.e. Type II principal–principal problem). In this regard, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued
that in some countries the Type II agency problem is more usual than Type I agency
problem (e.g. see La Porta et al., 1999, for an extensive survey).
Adopting the agency lens, “control” is associated with voting control and board power
(Villalonga et al., 2015), and this involves strong connection between the interests of
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders although the effects can be different
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). That view is shared by Villalonga and
Amit (2006), who suggested that in situations where the major shareholder is an individual
or a family, there will be a greater incentive for both the monitoring of the manager and the
expropriation of minority shareholders. Thus, two opposite differentiated firm’s behaviors
have been argued in the analysis of the relation between concentrated ownership structure
and firm performance when analyzing the relationship between controlling shareholders
and minority shareholders: the convergence of interests hypothesis and the entrenchment
hypothesis ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Morck et al., 1988; Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997).
The convergence of interest hypothesis suggests that the controlling shareholders face
strong incentives to monitor managers and maximize profits when they retain substantial
cash flow rights in addition to control (La Porta et al., 1999). These incentives also enhance the
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value of minority shares, and hence the interests of both shareholders’ group converge. Since
the board of directors is an effective corporate mechanism and from there the controlling
shareholders can exercise control over the firm, when the percentage of ownership by
directors grows, their interests and those who represent minority shareholders are aligned. In
this way, Type II agency problem tends to disappear and the hypothesis of convergence of
interests prevails. Consequently, an improvement in the firm’s performance is expected
because the dissonance between shareholder groups is reduced.
In the context of family firms, family owner-directors are likely to have more incentives
to be good monitors because in addition to linking their wealth with the firm (Chrisman
et al., 2004) they maintain emotional ties with the family firm (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007).
Family members have incentives to be good monitors because their economic and
non-economic preferences are linked to the continuation of the firm and therefore, it is to be
expected that agency conflicts are minimized in family firms and lower than they are in
non-family firms (Chrisman et al., 2005).
The so-called entrenchment hypothesis is based on the idea that concentrated ownership
creates incentives for the controlling shareholder to expropriate wealth from minority
shareholders. The entrenchment hypothesis claims that the more concentrated the ownership is,
the more serious the information asymmetry and the agent problems that exist between
controlling and minority shareholders are (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The “private benefits of
control” hypothesis labeled by Grossman and Hart (1984) can appear because the controlling
shareholder may use its dominant position in the firm. Morck et al. (1988) suggested that, at high
level of ownership by board members, these directors may use the voting power to secure their
positions, and it can be seen as an entrenchment problem. This view is also shared by Ozkan and
Ozkan (2004), who maintained that higher levels of board ownership give controlling board
members more voting control and influence over the firm, increasing their ability to resist outside
pressures, which can lead to difficulties for minority shareholders in developing their functions in
the board. The board of directors as a governance mechanism may not help protect minority
shareholders if it is highly controlled by major shareholders. Therefore, Morck et al. (1988)
predicted that concentrated ownership above a certain threshold has a negative effect on the firm
value due to the inherent conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.
In this regard, Villalonga and Amit (2006) considered controlling shareholder situations in
other institutions apart from family firms, and argued that the private benefits of excessive
control over the firm are, in general, divided among several groups of stockholders (e.g. banks,
and other corporations and institutions). In these cases, controlling shareholders can redistribute
wealth from other minority shareholders, whose interests need not coincide (De Miguel et al.,
2004). It is therefore concluded that in non-family firms the controlling shareholders’ incentives
for expropriating the minority shareholders are diluted and are less pronounced than in family
firms (Morck and Yeung, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). According to Villalonga et al. (2015,
p. 640), “in family firms, more than in any other corporation with concentrated ownership,
Agency Problem II is likely to overshadow Agency Problem I.” In fact, the empirical literature
has shown that under the assumption of (asymmetric) altruism and opportunistic behavior,
family firms are exposed to agency costs (Siebels and zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2012). That view
is shared by Corbetta and Salvato (2004) who, adopting the agency view, also considered that
the altruistic tendencies of family members are limited to narrower family groups and it does not
help align the incentives of different board members (or board groups).
In summary, the existence of these two competing arguments suggests the possibility of
a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance in family
firms. Therefore, we hypothesize an inverted U-shaped relationship in the context of family
SMEs between the percentage of ownership by the family members of the board of directors
and firm performance. Thus, as FOB increases, we expect to observe first a positive
alignment between family controlling board members and other non-family shareholders’
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interests leading a positive impact on firm performance (convergence of interest hypothesis).
Then, we expect a negative effect (entrenchment hypothesis) exerted by FOB on firm
performance because of reduced alignment of interests between the controlling family board
members and the rest of shareholder groups. Formally:
H1. There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between family board members’
ownership and firm performance in family SMEs.
To validate this hypothesis, firm performance is regressed against FOB and its square.
The inclusion of these two variables in the value model enables us to explicitly test both the
convergence of interest and entrenchment effects as well as to optimally determine the
breakpoint of the value–concentration relationship:
Yi ¼ b0þb1FOBiþb2FOBi2þb3GOiþb4Leviþb5Sizeiþb6AgeiþeI ; (1)
where i refers to family firm 1 to n.
In addition, to test the non-linear nature of the relationship we also hypothesize a cubic
model that implies two turning points. The S-shaped form allows the possibility that the
relationship becomes positive again above some level of FOB. This could happen in boards
dominated by different families or family branches because it implies the necessity of a
greater convergence of interests between different family members of the board of directors
(or groups of board members) as family ties may be more diffuse than in situations where
there is either only one family or earlier generations controlling the board of directors. Based
on the arguments mentioned above, we hypothesize an S-shaped relationship between the
percentage of ownership by the family members of the board of directors and firm
performance. Formally:
H2. There is a cubic relationship between family board members’ ownership and firm
performance in family SMEs.
Our model extends the piecewise linear regression of Morck et al. (1988) by permitting the
coefficients on the FOB variables to determine their optimal breakpoints. To test this
hypothesis we suggest the following model:
Yi ¼ b0þb1FOBiþb2FOB2i þb3FOB3i þb4GOiþb5Leviþb6Sizeiþb7Ageiþei; (2)
where i refers to family firm 1 to n.
2.2 The generational perspective in ownership concentration and board of directors
The arguments previously reported highlight the potentially positive and negative effects of
concentrated (family) ownership in the board on firm performance. They also outline the
contrasting views between the convergence of interest and entrenchment hypotheses. But a
firm’s ownership structure can be defined not only by the ownership concentration (whether
diffuse or concentrated) but also by the role and identity of the owners in the firm. This
happens, for instance, in the case of family firms as generational involvement may be a
unique predictor of governance behavior in these firms.
First-generation family firm is defined as a family-owned and managed firm by members
of the first-generation or founding generation of the family involved in the business. In the
latter type of family firm, stronger ties are created between the family and the firm. The
founding family shares a common destiny with the firm and there is a concurrence of family
and business objectives (Miller and LeBreton-Miller, 2005). Founding-owner and a narrow
group of family members are involved in ownership, governance and management, which
alleviates or eliminates agency problems.
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When multiple generations, i.e., second-, third- and later-generations are involved in the
ownership and the management of the family firm, priorities and the nature of problems may
begin to change (Gersick et al., 1997). Conflicts may ensue when the interests of the family
members diverge, and agency relationships between various participants in the firm are
conducted on the basis of economic and non-economic preferences (Chrisman et al., 2005;
Sharma et al., 2007). When family members are involved in different roles in the firm,
intra-family agency problems can arise between principals (family shareholders) and agents
(family members also involved in governance and/or management) as the likelihood of opposite
opinions and objectives increases and agents pursue their interests contravening those of the
principals (Chrisman et al., 2004). Thus, Davis and Harveston (2001) found that more conflicts
arise when second-, third- or later-generations run family firm. Relationships during the sibling
partnership stage becomemore problematic; moreover, the family (or part of the family) could be
progressively becoming a passive owner (Gedajlovic et al., 2004). Although some shareholders
(actively) participate in the governance and/or management of the firm (agent–family
shareholders), others may take a passive role (principal–family shareholders), and as a result
members may have different interests and goals (Siebels and zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2012). For
example, passive shareholders might prefer high dividend payouts, whereas active shareholders
would rather retain profits and use them for reinvestment (May, 2004, cited by Siebels and zu
Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2012). Moreover, sibling partners are likely to prioritize concerns for their
own and narrow family welfare over concerns for each sibling’s welfare (Gersick et al., 1997).
Thus, family cohesion in subsequent generations could be weaker and therefore the sense of
shared interests of family members would be lower. In addition, family firms are potentially
subject to an additional conflict of interest between family shareholders and family non-
shareholders. In this case, as in any agency relationship, the goals of principal and agent may
diverge. According to Villalonga et al. (2015), family shareholders, being part of the larger family
group, are likely to share some or all of the larger family objectives, but they are also likely to
have some objectives of their own that may conflict with those of the family as a whole.
Consequently, second-, third- or later-generation family firms need a lower percentage of
ownership on the board of directors to control and influence the firm because share
ownership is more widespread than previously. Formally:
H3. The turning point of family board members’ ownership, both in quadratic and cubic
relationships, decreases over generations.
This relationship is analyzed using the following models:
Yi ¼ b0þb1FOBiþb2FOB2i þb3FOBi  Gen1iþb4FOBi  Gen2i
þb5FOBi  Gen3iþb6FOB2i  Gen1iþb7FOB2i  Gen2i
þb8FOB2i  Gen3iþb9Gen1iþb10Gen2iþb11Gen3ib7
þb12GOiþb13Leviþb14Sizeiþb15Ageiþe; (3)
Yi ¼ b0þb1FOBiþb2FOB2i þb3FOB3i þb4FOBi  Gen1i
þb5FOBi  Gen2iþb6FOBi  Gen3iþb7FOB2i  Gen1i
þb8FOB2i  Gen2iþb9FOB2i  Gen3iþb10FOB3i  Gen1i
þb11FOB3i  Gen2iþb12FOB3i  Gen3iþb13Gen1iþb14Gen2i
þb15Gen3iþb16GOiþb17Leviþb18Sizeiþb19Ageiþe; (4)
where i refers to family firm 1 to n.
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3. Empirical research: method, data and analysis
3.1 Sample and data sources
We conducted a study of Spanish small- and medium-sized family firms included in the
Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System (SABI) database provided by Bureau Van Dijk. We
imposed certain restrictions on this group of firms in order to obtain a sample that is
representative of the population. We eliminated firms affected by special situations such as
insolvency, winding-up, liquidation, or zero activity and we eliminated listed companies and
firms with less than 50 employees. Thus, companies were large enough to ensure the
existence of a management team and a board of director. Finally, selected firms should have
provided financial information in 2013.
In this study companies must meet the following two conditions to consider them as
family firms (Arosa et al., 2010): majority ownership is controlled by a single family (over 50
percent of shares); and family members actively participate in firm management. To find
compliance with these two conditions, we conducted an exhaustive review of shareholding
structure (percentage of common stock) and composition (names and surnames of
shareholders), and examined the composition of the board of directors of each of the selected
firms in the database. The sample comprised 1,493 private Spanish firms.
Once the preliminary criteria were established, the financial reporting information
was obtained from the SABI database, which collects financial information from annual
accounts filed with the Spanish Mercantile Register. Subsequently, a structured
questionnaire was used to collect additional information on items not included in the
SABI database as, for example, the percentage of ownership of family members in the
board of directors and the generational involvement in the firm, which is consistent with
studies investigating family firms (Eddleston et al., 2008). A professional survey agency
was employed to collect data by means of telephone interviews, a method that ensures a
high response rate. To maximize responses, managers received written notifications
regarding the purpose and importance of the research before the study was conducted.
To ensure a high response rate and reliable and accurate responses, the CEOs were
promised that the information about the respondents and the company would remain
strictly confidential. Telephone interviews were scheduled in advance in cases where
managers signaled reluctance or limited availability. The total response rate to the
questionnaire was 24.72 percent of the sample, i.e., 369 family firms out of 1,493.
Considering data depuration, the final sample was 313 family firms or 20.96 percent of the
overall sample. These 313 firms are a representative sample with a confidence level
of 95% (Malhotra and Birks, 2007).
We used some techniques to reduce the potential response bias. First, we protected the
respondents’ anonymity by assuring the confidentiality of their responses in the cover
letter that accompanied the survey (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Second, we created a pre-test to
fine-tune the questionnaire and prepared a presentation letter, emphasizing the need for
research on ownership structure of family firms and their boards of directors in order to
increase the interest in the topic. Moreover, a non-response analysis revealed no
statistically significant differences between respondents and non-respondents with regard
to age and size ( p-valueW0.1).
3.2 Variable measurement
3.2.1 Dependent variable. Several performance indicators have been used for measuring
performance as growth in sales, growth in market share, growth in employees, growth in
profitability, return on equity, return on total assets, profit margin on sales or the ability to
fund growth from profits, among others (Eddleston et al., 2008). In this regard, several
articles use indicators obtained through questionnaire survey as assessment of performance
(e.g. Arzubiaga et al., 2018; Sanchez-Famoso et al., 2017). However, other studies use
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indicators obtained from financial reporting information as performance measure (e.g. Chu,
2009; Mazzola et al., 2013). In this paper, the profitability is measured by the accounting
measure return on assets (ROA) obtained from the annual accounts collected from SABI.
ROA indicates how well a firm is performing by comparing the profit it is generating to the
capital invested in its assets. ROA ratio formula is calculated by dividing operating income
(earnings before interest and taxes, EBIT) by the book value of total assets.
3.2.2 Independent variables. Family ownership in the board (FOB). This variable
indicates the percentage of ownership of family members in the board of directors.
Generational involvement in the firm (Gen). Consistent with Miller et al. (2007), we
have generated three Gen variables. Gen1 has a value of 1 if the firm is managed by the
first generation and 0 otherwise; Gen2 has a value of 1 if the firm is managed by the
second generation and 0 otherwise; and Gen3 takes the value of 1 if the firm is managed by
the third- and later generations and 0 otherwise. These three variables enable us to
analyze whether the behavior of family firms varies depending on the generation that
manages the firms.
3.2.3 Control variables. Different additional variables were included to calibrate the
model specification and to consider possible alternative explanations for the results of our
study. Firm Size was measured by the total assets (e.g. Hernandez-Trasobares and
Galve-Gorriz, 2017). Growth opportunities (GO) has been proxied by the sales growth rate,
i.e., Salest/Salest−1, following Acedo-Ramirez et al. (2017) and Steijvers and Niskanen (2013)
given that it cannot be measured using the book-to-market ratio since no information is
available about market value. The degree of leverage (Lev) is also a control variable that is
used to avoid the influence of ownership structure on firm financial structure (Demsetz and
Lehn, 1985). In these models, we use the total debt to total assets ratio to measure the degree
of leverage (Maseda et al., 2015). Finally, firm age (Age) is measured by taking into
consideration the time since the firm was established (Barros et al., 2017). The Size and Age
variables were both log-transformed to achieve normality.
3.3 Method
We applied a cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model to test the
hypotheses presented in the preceding section. The quadratic relations proposed in
Equations (1) and (3) presented only one breakpoint for each generation, which could be
optimally derived by differentiating performance with respect to FOB. Letting this partial
derivative equal 0, this breakpoint is FOB¼−β1/2β2. The coefficients display an inverted U
shaped, with the breakpoint occurring when β1 and β2 are significantly positive and
negative, respectively (De Miguel et al., 2004).
Our second model tested an S-shaped form of the relationship between firm value and
FOB (Equations (2) and (4)). This model extended the piecewise linear regression of Morck
et al. (1988), enabling the coefficients on the FOB variables to determine their optimal
breakpoints. According to De Miguel et al. (2004), these optimal breakpoints could be
calculated by differentiating profitability from FOB. Equating the partial derivative to 0, the
cut-off points were given by the following equation:
FOB=FOB2 ¼ 2b17
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4b22b1b3
q 
=6b3:
In order to test for multicollinearity, the VIF was calculated for each independent variable.
The results (Table II) indicated that all the independent variables had VIF values of less
than 10.
Finally, we also checked for potential endogeneity problems, specifically reverse
causality in the relationship between the dependent and independent variables.
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4. Results
Tables I and II present the descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for the variables
used in this study. It should be noted that the average of FOB stake in family firms in the
sample is 52 percent. Nevertheless, when different generations join the firm, this ownership
stake is diluted significantly.
Given that there might be a potential problem of the endogeneity of FOB, we estimate our
models using an instrumental variable (IV ) analysis. On the basis of the availability of data
and the correlations (Maseda et al., 2015), we identified the instrument “number of family
directors” that is correlated with FOB (−0.2050, p-valueo0.01) but unrelated to firm
performance (0.0281, p-valueW0.01). This instrument is considered valid ( p-valueo0.00)
for the first-stage regressions in the models. These indicate a sufficiently strong correlation
between the instrument and the potential endogenous variable FOB. Having established a
significant correlation between the instrument and FOB and given the validity of the
instrument, the IV results can then be used to address the question of whether the FOB
effect estimated by a simple OLS regression is substantially biased or not (Bennedsen et al.,
2007). The Hausman F-test, p-valueW0.01, does not reject the null hypothesis of no
endogeneity in any of the models (Bennedsen et al., 2007). Thus, our OLS regression results
are unlikely to be inconsistent or biased.
Table III shows the results of regression analysis. All the models tested are significant
( p-valueo0.00). R2 is not high in any model, although always higher than 0.1. Scholars do
suggest the convenience of scoring higher values than 0.1 in R2 (Falk and Miller, 1992),
although acceptable R2 values depend on the research context (Hair et al., 2011).
Family firms
Number of observations 313
1st Gen
102
2nd Gen
144
3rd Gen
67
Family board ownership (%) 51.73
1st Gen
59.06
2nd Gen
50.62
3rd Gen
43.14
Control variables
Return on assets (%) 6.72
Growth opportunity (Sales0/Sales−1) (%) 14.61
Leverage (total debt/total assets) 42.50
Firm’s size (total assets) (thousand euros) 27,309.48
Firm’s age (years) 40
Sources: Data of ownership structure and board of directors were obtained from the survey. Financial
information was obtained from SABI
Table I.
Descriptive statistics
Variables VIF 1 2 3 4 5 7
1. ROA 1.30 1
2. FOB 1.23 0.02 1
3. GO 1.10 −0.05 −0.01 1
4. Leverage 1.15 −0.23* 0.12* −0.24* 1
5. Firm size 1.10 1.10 −0.09 −0.05 0.13* 1
6. Firm age 1.05 −0.01 −0.11* −0.013 0.03 0.01 1
Note: *Correlation is significant at the 1 percent level
Table II.
Correlation data
Family board
ownership
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In the first regression (Equation (1)), we examined the influence of FOB on firm performance
without considering the generation runs on the firm (Table III, Column I). The coefficient on
the FOB variable is positive (β1¼ 0.08) and negative for its square (β2¼−0.078). These
results confirm our first hypothesis (H1) that an inverted U-shaped relationship exists
between FOB and firm performance in family SMEs. This result demonstrates the existence
of an optimal level of FOB, which stands at approximately 52.56 percent (Figure 1).
ROA
I II III IV
Constant −0.042 −0.027 −0.04 0.008
FOB 0.082** 0.262*** 0.098 0.087
FOB2 −0.078** −0.629** 0.095 −0.082
FOB3 0.384** 0.007
FOB×Gen1 0.279** 0.427**
FOB×Gen2 0.149 −0.236
FOB×Gen3 0.154 0.301
FOB2×Gen1 −0.260** −0.893**
FOB2×Gen2 −0.123 −0.469
FOB2×Gen3 −0.155 −0.605
FOB3×Gen1 0.491*
FOB3×Gen2 0.259
FOB3×Gen3 0.310
Gen1 0.043** 0.043** 0.023 0.017
Gen2 0.017 0.014 −0.001 −0.02
Gen3 0.016 0.012 0.009 0.001
GO −0.048 −0.002* −0.002* −0.001
Lev −0.083*** −0.090*** −0.103*** −0.097***
Size 0.009*** 0.007** 0.008** 0.007**
Age 0.032 0.006 0.003 0.006
F-value 3.93*** 4.02*** 3.21 2.74
R2 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.19
Notes: *,**,***Significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively
Table III.
Regression results
ROA
FOB
EntrenchmentConvergence of
interest
52.56% 53.65%
Note: The hypothesized S-shaped family board
ownership–performance link
Figure 1.
U-shaped relationship
between family
board ownership and
firm performance
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In Table III, Column II, β1 and β3 are positive and β2 is negative, which supports the S-
shaped specification for the value proposed by the second hypothesis (H2). There is
evidence of a significant cubic relationship between FOB and firm profitability in family
firms. Firm performance increases with relatively high and low levels of FOB and falls at
intermediate levels. OnceH2 is supported, the next step is to calculate the breakpoints. We
note that when FOB is between 0 and 28.01 percent, an increase in the percentage of
ownership positively improves firm performance. However, when FOB is between 28.01
and 81.19 percent, the firm performance decreases as the percentage of ownership
increases (Figure 2).
In order to fulfill the second objective of the study, we compared the behavior of family
firms when second- and later-generations run family firm. We analyzed whether significant
differences exist in the optimal FOB proportion for the sample firms based on their
generational stage. We included three variables to indicate the generation that is managing
the firms (first, second and later generations). Our statistical results provide support for
first-generation family firms. The coefficient is positive and significant (β4¼ 0.279, Column
III) and its square is negative and significant (β7¼−0.260, Table III, Column III). Therefore,
the results indicated an inverted U-shaped relationship because the coefficients β1 and β2 are
significantly positive and negative, respectively. This result demonstrates that the optimal
level of FOB of first-generation family firms stands at approximately 53.65 percent.
Nevertheless, for second-generation and subsequent generation family firms, the
coefficients are not significant. The results exhibit no relationship between the proportion
of FOB and firm performance when the second- and later-generations run family firms.
Finally, we test whether there is evidence of a significant cubic relationship between FOB
and firm performance based on the generation that manages the firm. The results shown in
Table III (Column IV) confirmed the existence of a cubic relationship between FOB and
profitability in family firms run by the first generation. The coefficients β4 (0.427) and β10
(0.491) are positive and significant and β7 (−0.893) is negative and significant. Therefore, our
results indicate that the break-point at which the relation between FOB and firm
performance turns from positive to negative is 32.76 percent in first-generation family firms.
Over that level of ownership, an increase of FOB negatively influences firm performance.
The break-point in which the relationship turns from negative to positive stands at
approximately 88.49 percent. Nevertheless, for second- and later-generation family firms no
cubic relationship is supported. Although if we compare the values of the breakpoints for
the whole sample vis-à-vis Gen1 we see that the former is lower which suggests that the
ROA
FOB
EntrenchmentConvergence of
interest
Convergence of
interest
28.01% 37.76% 81.19% 88.49%
Figure 2.
S-shaped relationship
between family
board ownership and
firm performance
Family board
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inclusion of later generations in the sample lowers the break-point offering some support
(albeit not conclusive as such) to the idea posited in H3. This is the case in both the
quadratic and cubic equations.
5. Discussion, implications and limitations
Most of the previous studies that explore the agency problem of family firms have focused
on managerial ownership instead of board ownership. The present study is one of the few
empirical articles that examine the relationship between FOB and performance in family
SMEs as the shares held by the family directors can be an indicator of the control and
influence of majority (family) owners. The results provide evidence that the composition of
the board is one mechanism which can explain agency relationships within family firms.
We suggest an inverted U-shaped relationship between the percentage of ownership by
the family directors and firm performance. The results confirm our hypotheses, both in the
set of family firms sample and in the specific case of first-generation family firms, the family
firm performance is maximized when the proportion of family ownership of the board
reaches 52.56 and 53.65 percent, respectively. However, beyond those points of optimal
ownership concentration, performance is negatively affected.
These findings suggest that the degree of performance is increasing as the percentage of
FOB and convergent-of-interest effect increases. However, when family directors own a
substantial percentage of shares which gives them the complete control and influence on the
board, firm performance decreases and the entrenchment hypothesis prevails. Thus, the
convergence of interest hypothesis and expropriation hypothesis have opposite predictions in
determining board ownership concentration and performance relationship in family SMEs.
The positive perspective suggests that FOB is an important tool to supervise management by
effective monitoring. The interest of family directors in monitoring and supporting top
management is shared with minority shareholders and their representatives on the board, and
thus, the effect of convergence of interests prevails. The negative perspective supports the
idea that the positive impact of an effective monitoring activity in the board is mitigated by a
substantial voting power and a high degree of influence of family owner-directors. To reduce
the expropriation effect, one strategy could be to consider opening up family firms’ equity to
other shareholders or to introduce active (independent) outside directors whilst retaining
family influence, which would secure the advantages of concentrated ownership.
Moreover, our results suggest that the percentage of ownership which is required to
maximize FOB–performance relationship is higher in first-generation family firms than in
the overall of the family firms. The reason can be that second, third and later generations of
family firms need a lower percentage of ownership to control and influence the firm since
there is a tendency for share ownership to become dispersed among larger numbers of
family branches/members. It should also be noted that the family influence can be measured
not only on the basis of ownership, but also on whether a family member holds the position
of chief executive officer or family members are in the senior management. In this regard, it
should also be noted that though we found the results support the convergence of interest
and entrenchment effects for first-generation family firms, in second and later generations
there is no significant relationship between FOB and firm performance. It is not possible to
predict a specific relationship.
This study expands on several others exploring non-linear effects of FOB on firm
performance. Specifically, it also hypothesized a cubic relationship between those variables.
Our statistical results provide support for this hypothesis and indicate that an S-shaped
form is not only significant in the overall sample, but also in the specific case of first-
generation family firms. In this sense, the results are consistent with those of Morck et al.
(1988) and De Miguel et al. (2004) for large publicly listed firms. The breakpoints for
first-generation family firms also are higher than those of the overall sample, which
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includes all generations. In first-generation family firms, the optimal level of FOB stands at
32.76 percent compared with 28.01 percent for the entire sample of family firms. Beyond
those breakpoints, an increase in the percentage of shares held by family directors
negatively influences firm performance. In addition, the S-shaped form allows the possibility
that the relationship becomes positive again above a break-point of 81.19 and 88.49 percent
of FOB, in the case of first generation and the overall sample of family firms, respectively.
Put differently, when family members own a substantial percentage of shares, their interests
are also aligned with minority shareholders. This situation could be possible in family firms
with different family groups or family branches because it implies a greater convergence of
interests between different members of the board of directors. In firms whose ownership is
concentrated in different family branches, family directors can help align the different
interests of branches which also allow the interests of minority shareholders to be aligned
with controlling owners.
Although our results are exploratory in nature, they have meaningful practical
implications for the effective composition of board of directors. Families have a strong
interest in firm survival since most of them consider the family firm as an asset that should
be passed on from generation to generation. Families are not just a large shareholder, they
are part of the firm and may even feel responsible for other outside shareholders. Family
directors should therefore have incentives to monitor firm activity closely. Board of
directors can mitigate agency problems because directors can improve communication
between family shareholders involved in the firm and outside non-family members
(minority shareholders) as well as with outside family members (or their representatives in
the family council). Hence, the importance of selecting representatives in the board who
work as a link and point of union between the family and the firm helping to align the
respective interest of family branches. Moreover, it could be important to introduce active
outsiders into boards because they have other skills and knowledge that can help board of
directors’ monitory and strategic tasks.
A limitation found in this research derives from the size and composition of the sample
itself, which was composed of 313 family SMEs. There is no guarantee that the results
obtained can be generalized to other contexts. However, non-response bias was not
observed. Therefore, a similar study could be conducted in countries other than Spain in
order to increase the validity of our result. Another limitation is related to the use of cross-
sectional data, together with the fact that part of the data was collected from a survey as all
the necessary information were not publicly available. A research design based on
longitudinal data would be more suitable for this type of research in order to increase the
reliability of causality directions.
Nevertheless, this study can contribute to improve our knowledge of ownership
characteristics and types of owners in the corporate governance literature. Since ownership
is an essential dimension of corporate governance research, it is important to take into
account the ownership structure in SMEs, most of which being family firms. As Daspit et al.
(2018) asserted, the nature of involvement of owners in governance bodies such as the board
of directors, family council, etc., can have influential behavioral and performance
implications at the firm and/or family levels. In this regard, future lines of research could
analyze the influence of different governance bodies on family firm.
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